From 31da67fd4266b07166eb7e0211ed8be29b0e3189 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: duck Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2004 23:54:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] network comparisons (duck) --- pages/header.html | 2 +- pages/how.html | 2 +- pages/how_networkcomparisons.html | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 pages/how_networkcomparisons.html diff --git a/pages/header.html b/pages/header.html index ab6f4424..40c651a8 100644 --- a/pages/header.html +++ b/pages/header.html @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ echo "\n";   * Peer selection[ ]
  * Cryptography[ ]
    > ElGamal /
AES+SessionTag[x]
-  * Network comparisons[ ]
+  * Network comparisons[x]

--> FAQ[x]
diff --git a/pages/how.html b/pages/how.html index c2ee46d4..f06835bb 100644 --- a/pages/how.html +++ b/pages/how.html @@ -8,5 +8,5 @@
  • Peer selection[ ]
  • Cryptography[ ]
      > ElGamal / AES+SessionTag[x]
    • -
  • Network comparisons[ ]
    • +
  • Network comparisons[x]
    • diff --git a/pages/how_networkcomparisons.html b/pages/how_networkcomparisons.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5983bdf6 --- /dev/null +++ b/pages/how_networkcomparisons.html @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +

    Network comparisons

    +

    +There are a great many other applications and projects working on anonymous +communication and I2P has been inspired by much of their efforts. This is not +a comprehensive list of anonymity resources - both freehaven's +Anonymity Bibliography +and GNUnet's related projects serve +that purpose well. That said, a few systems stand out for further comparison:

    + + + +

    Morphmix and Tarzan

    + +[Morphmix] + [Tarzan] + +

    +Morphmix and Tarzan are both fully distributed, peer to peer networks of +anonymizing proxies, allowing people to tunnel out through the low latency +mix network. Morphmix includes some very interesting collusion detection +algorithms and Sybil defenses, while Tarzan makes use of the scarcity of IP +addresses to accomplishs the same. The two primary differences between +these systems and I2P are related to I2P's threat model +and their out-proxy design (as opposed to providing both sender and receiver +anonymity). There is source code available to both systems, but we are not aware +of their use outside of academic environments.

    +

    +Stealing quite directly from the Tarzan paper, the following includes a quick +comparison of Tarzan, Crowds, Onion Routing (OR), and I2P:

    + + + +

    TOR / Onion Routing

    + +[TOR] + [Onion Routing] +

    +TOR and Onion Routing are both anonymizing proxy networks, allowing people +to tunnel out through their low latency mix network. The two primary +differences between TOR / OnionRouting and I2P are again related to differences +in the threat model and the out-proxy design (though TOR is working to provide +redevous points within the mix network, which will provide recipient anonymity). +In addition, these networks take the directory based approach - providing a +centralized point to manage the overall 'view' of the network, as well as gather +and report statistics, as opposed to I2P's distributed + +network database and peer selection.

    + +

    On the technical side, there are 5 main differences between TOR and I2P:

    + + +

    Mixminion / Mixmaster

    + +[Mixminion] + [Mixmaster] + +

    +Mixminion and Mixmaster are networks to support anonymous email against a very +powerful adversary. I2P aims to provide an adequate means to meet their threat +model as we reach I2P 3.0 along side the needs of low latency users, providing +a significantly larger anonymity set. As with TOR and Onion Routing above, +both Mixminion and Mixmaster take the directory based approach as well.

    + +

    Freenet

    + +[Freenet] +

    +Freenet is a fully distributed, peer to peer anonymous publishing network. +As such, generic anonymous communication over it requires the use of the global +blackboard model - storing data somewhere that the recipient will then check +for a message. Freenet also does not support the concept of user defined delays - +it stores and fetches data as quickly as it can, rather than queueing up, pooling, +delaying, and mixing the data, leaving a hole with regards to long term intersection +attacks. In addition, there seem to be some performance issues that can arguably +be attributed to the global blackboard model which will likely rule out interactive +low latency communication.

    + +

    JAP

    + +[JAP] + +

    +JAP (Java Anonymous Proxy) is a network of mix cascades for anonymizing web requests, +and as such it has a few centralized nodes (participants in the cascade) that blend +and mix requests from clients through the sequence of nodes (the cascade) before +proxying out onto the web. The scope, threat model, and security is substantially +different from I2P, but for those who don't require significant anonymity but still +are not satisfied with an Anonymizer-like service, JAP is worth reviewing. One +caution to note is that anyone under the jurisdiction of the German courts may want +to take care, as the German Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation (FBCI) has has +successfully mounted an +[attack] +on the network. Even though the method of this attack was later found to be illegal +in the German courts, the fact that the data was successfully collected is the +concern. Courts change their minds based upon circumstance, and this is evidence that +if a government body or intelligence agency wanted to, they could gather the data, even +if it may be found inadmissible in some courts later) +