% -> % to fix translations problems

i2p2www/pages/site/docs/how/network-database.html

@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ automatically enabled.
 {%- endtrans %}</p>
 
 <p>{% trans -%}
-With the current rules for automatic opt-in, approximately 6% of
+With the current rules for automatic opt-in, approximately 6&#37; of
 the routers in the network are floodfill routers.
 {%- endtrans %}</p>
 
@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ more correlative. Of course, a larger network makes a Sybil attack that much har
 <p>{% trans threatmodel=site_url('docs/how/threat-model') -%}
 However, the general issue of DHT information leakage in I2P needs further investigation.
 The floodfill routers are in a position to observe queries and gather information.
-Certainly, at a level of <i>f</i> = 0.2 (20% malicious nodes, as specifed in the paper)
+Certainly, at a level of <i>f</i> = 0.2 (20&#37; malicious nodes, as specifed in the paper)
 we expect that many of the Sybil threats we describe
 (<a href="{{ threatmodel }}#sybil">here</a>,
 <a href="#sybil">here</a> and

i2p2www/pages/site/docs/how/peer-selection.html

@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ To prevent some simple attacks, and for performance, there are the following res
 Two peers from the same /16 IP space may not be in the same tunnel.
 {%- endtrans %}</li>
 <li>{% trans -%}
-A peer may participate in a maximum of 33% of all tunnels created by the router.
+A peer may participate in a maximum of 33&#37; of all tunnels created by the router.
 {%- endtrans %}</li>
 <li>{% trans -%}
 Peers with extremely low bandwidth are not used.

i2p2www/pages/site/docs/how/threat-model.html

@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ willing to contribute. The defense against this is:
 Set defaults so that most users provide resources to the network.
 In I2P, users route traffic by default. In sharp distinction to
 <a href="{{ comparisons }}">other networks</a>,
-over 95% of I2P users relay traffic for others.
+over 95&#37; of I2P users relay traffic for others.
 {%- endtrans %}</li>
   <li>{% trans -%}
 Provide easy configuration options so that users may increase their
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ Reference: <a href="{{ pdf }}">Breaking and Improving Protocol Obfuscation</a>
 Sybil describes a category of attacks where the adversary creates arbitrarily
 large numbers of colluding nodes and uses the increased numbers to help 
 mounting other attacks.  For instance, if an attacker is in a network where peers
-are selected randomly and they want an 80% chance to be one of those peers, they
+are selected randomly and they want an 80&#37; chance to be one of those peers, they
 simply create five times the number of nodes that are in the network and roll 
 the dice.  When identity is free, Sybil can be a very potent technique for a 
 powerful adversary.  The primary technique to address this is simply to make 
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ This is somewhat mitigated by our
 <a href="{{ peerselection }}">peer profiling</a> methods used to monitor the performance
 of peers.
 However, this is a powerful attack as the number of routers approaches
-<i>f</i> = 0.2, or 20% malicious nodes, as specifed in the paper.
+<i>f</i> = 0.2, or 20&#37; malicious nodes, as specifed in the paper.
 The malicous routers could also maintain connections to the target router and provide
 excellent forwarding bandwidth for traffic over those connections, in an attempt
 to manipulate the profiles managed by the target and appear attractive.