From a796ae5d0405c052409a7c6034937dade8102e82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: str4d
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 22:42:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Added translation tags to comparison/*
---
i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/freenet.html | 20 +-
i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/index.html | 20 +-
.../pages/site/comparison/other-networks.html | 78 +++--
i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/tor.html | 274 ++++++++++++------
4 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 145 deletions(-)
diff --git a/i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/freenet.html b/i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/freenet.html
index 0affc7f1..1597cf79 100644
--- a/i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/freenet.html
+++ b/i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/freenet.html
@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
{% extends "global/layout.html" %}
-{% block title %}I2P Compared to Freenet{% endblock %}
+{% block title %}{{ _('I2P Compared to Freenet') }}{% endblock %}
{% block content %}
Freenet
[Freenet]
-Freenet is a fully distributed, peer to peer anonymous publishing network, offering
+
{% trans -%}
+Freenet is a fully distributed, peer to peer anonymous publishing network, offering
secure ways to store data, as well as some approaches attempting to address the loads
of a flash flood. While Freenet is designed as a distributed data store, people have
built applications on top of it to do more generic anonymous communication, such as
-static websites and message boards.
+static websites and message boards.
+{%- endtrans %}
-Compared to I2P, Freenet offers some substantial benefits - it is a distributed data
+
{% trans -%}
+Compared to I2P, Freenet offers some substantial benefits - it is a distributed data
store, while I2P is not, allowing people to retrieve the content published by others
even when the publisher is no longer online. In addition, it should be able to
distribute popular data fairly efficiently. I2P itself does not and will not provide
@@ -20,15 +23,18 @@ communicate with each other anonymously through websites, message boards, file s
programs, etc. There have also been some attempts to develop a distributed data
store to run on top of I2P,
(most recently a port of Tahoe-LAFS)
-but nothing is yet ready for general use.
+but nothing is yet ready for general use.
+{%- endtrans %}
-However, even ignoring any implementations issues, there are some concerns
+
{% trans -%}
+However, even ignoring any implementations issues, there are some concerns
about Freenet's algorithms from both a scalability and anonymity perspective, owing
largely to Freenet's heuristic driven routing. The interactions of various techniques
certainly may successfully deter various attacks, and perhaps some aspects of the
routing algorithms will provide the hoped for scalability. Unfortunately, not much
analysis of the algorithms involved has resulted in positive results, but there is still
hope. At the very least, Freenet does provide substantial anonymity against an attacker
-who does not have the resources necessary to analyze it further.
+who does not have the resources necessary to analyze it further.
+{%- endtrans %}
{% endblock %}
diff --git a/i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/index.html b/i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/index.html
index 79523633..f87651a5 100644
--- a/i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/index.html
+++ b/i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/index.html
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{% extends "global/layout.html" %}
-{% block title %}Comparing I2P to other projects{% endblock %}
+{% block title %}{{ _('Comparing I2P to other projects') }}{% endblock %}
{% block content %}
-
+
{% trans -%}
There are a great many other applications and projects working on anonymous
communication and I2P has been inspired by much of their efforts. This is not
a comprehensive list of anonymity resources - both freehaven's
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ a comprehensive list of anonymity resources - both freehaven's
and GNUnet's related projects
serve that purpose well. That said, a few systems stand out for further
comparison. The following have individual comparison pages:
-
+{%- endtrans %}
-
-The following are discussed on the other networks page:
-
+{% trans othernetworks=site_url('comparison/other-networks') -%}
+The following are discussed on the other networks page:
+{%- endtrans %}
- - Morphmix and Tarzan
+ - Morphmix / Tarzan
- Mixminion / Mixmaster
- JAP
- MUTE / AntsP2P
- Haystack
-
+
{% trans trac=i2pconv('trac.i2p2.i2p') -%}
The content of this page is subject to update, discussion and dispute, and we welcome comments and additions.
-You may contribute an analysis by entering a new ticket on Trac.
-
+You may contribute an analysis by entering a new ticket on Trac.
+{%- endtrans %}
{% endblock %}
diff --git a/i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/other-networks.html b/i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/other-networks.html
index 794aeb77..a8040c4e 100644
--- a/i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/other-networks.html
+++ b/i2p2www/pages/site/comparison/other-networks.html
@@ -1,38 +1,42 @@
{% extends "global/layout.html" %}
-{% block title %}I2P Compared to Other Anonymous Networks{% endblock %}
+{% block title %}{{ _('I2P Compared to Other Anonymous Networks') }}{% endblock %}
{% block content %}
-The following networks are discussed on this page.
-
+{% trans -%}
+The following networks are discussed on this page.
+{%- endtrans %}
-- Morphmix and Tarzan
+- Morphmix / Tarzan
- Mixminion / Mixmaster
- JAP
- MUTE / AntsP2P
- Haystack
-Most of the following sections are fairly old, and may not be accurate.
+
{% trans comparison=site_url('comparison'), trac=i2pconv('trac.i2p2.i2p') -%}
+Most of the following sections are fairly old, and may not be accurate.
For an overview of available comparisons, see the
-main network comparisons page.
+main network comparisons page.
You may contribute an analysis by entering a
-new ticket on trac.i2p2.de.
-
+new ticket on {{ trac }}.
+{%- endtrans %}
-Morphmix and Tarzan
+Morphmix / Tarzan
[Morphmix]
[Tarzan]
-Morphmix and Tarzan are both fully distributed, peer to peer networks of
+
{% trans threatmodel=site_url('docs/how/threat-model') -%}
+Morphmix and Tarzan are both fully distributed, peer to peer networks of
anonymizing proxies, allowing people to tunnel out through the low latency
mix network. Morphmix includes some very interesting collusion detection
algorithms and Sybil defenses, while Tarzan makes use of the scarcity of IP
addresses to accomplish the same. The two primary differences between
-these systems and I2P are related to I2P's threat model
+these systems and I2P are related to I2P's threat model
and their out-proxy design (as opposed to providing both sender and receiver
anonymity). There is source code available to both systems, but we are not aware
-of their use outside of academic environments.
+of their use outside of academic environments.
+{%- endtrans %}
-Comparison of Tor and I2P Terminology
+{{ _('Comparison of Tor and I2P Terminology') }}
+{% trans -%}
While Tor and I2P are similar in many ways, much of the terminology is different.
+{%- endtrans %}
Tor | I2P
- |
---|
Cell | Message
- |
Client | Router or Client
- |
Circuit | Tunnel
- |
Directory | NetDb
- |
Directory Server | Floodfill Router
- |
Entry Guards | Fast Peers
- |
Entry Node | Inproxy
- |
Exit Node | Outproxy
- |
Hidden Service | Eepsite or Destination
- |
Hidden Service Descriptor | LeaseSet
- |
Introduction point | Inbound Gateway
- |
Node | Router
- |
Onion Proxy | I2PTunnel Client (more or less)
- |
Relay | Router
- |
Rendezvous Point | somewhat like Inbound Gateway + Outbound Endpoint
- |
Router Descriptor | RouterInfo
- |
Server | Router
+ |
{{ _('Cell') }} | {{ _('Message') }}
+ |
{{ _('Client') }} | {{ _('Router or Client') }}
+ |
{{ _('Circuit') }} | {{ _('Tunnel') }}
+ |
{{ _('Directory') }} | {{ _('NetDb') }}
+ |
{{ _('Directory Server') }} | {{ _('Floodfill Router') }}
+ |
{{ _('Entry Guards') }} | {{ _('Fast Peers') }}
+ |
{{ _('Entry Node') }} | {{ _('Inproxy') }}
+ |
{{ _('Exit Node') }} | {{ _('Outproxy') }}
+ |
{{ _('Hidden Service') }} | {{ _('Eepsite or Destination') }}
+ |
{{ _('Hidden Service Descriptor') }} | {{ _('LeaseSet') }}
+ |
{{ _('Introduction point') }} | {{ _('Inbound Gateway') }}
+ |
{{ _('Node') }} | {{ _('Router') }}
+ |
{{ _('Onion Proxy') }} | {{ _('I2PTunnel Client (more or less)') }}
+ |
{{ _('Relay') }} | {{ _('Router') }}
+ |
{{ _('Rendezvous Point') }} | {{ _('somewhat like Inbound Gateway + Outbound Endpoint') }}
+ |
{{ _('Router Descriptor') }} | {{ _('RouterInfo') }}
+ |
{{ _('Server') }} | {{ _('Router') }}
|
-Benefits of Tor over I2P
+{{ _('Benefits of Tor over I2P') }}
- - Much bigger user base; much more visibility in the academic and hacker communities; benefits from
- formal studies of anonymity, resistance, and performance;
- has a non-anonymous, visible, university-based leader
- - Has already solved some scaling issues I2P has yet to address
- - Has significant funding
- - Has more developers, including several that are funded
- - More resistant to state-level blocking due to TLS transport layer and bridges
- (I2P has proposals for "full restricted routes" but these are not yet implemented)
- - Big enough that it has had to adapt to blocking and DOS attempts
- - Designed and optimized for exit traffic, with a large number of exit nodes
- - Better documentation, has formal papers and specifications, better website, many more translations
- - More efficient with memory usage
- - Tor client nodes have very low bandwidth overhead
- - Centralized control reduces the complexity at each
- node and can efficiently address Sybil attacks
- - A core of high capacity nodes provides higher
- throughput and lower latency
- - C, not Java (ewww)
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+Much bigger user base; much more visibility in the academic and hacker communities; benefits from
+formal studies of anonymity, resistance, and performance;
+has a non-anonymous, visible, university-based leader
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ - {% trans %}Has already solved some scaling issues I2P has yet to address{% endtrans %}
+ - {% trans %}Has significant funding{% endtrans %}
+ - {% trans %}Has more developers, including several that are funded{% endtrans %}
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+More resistant to state-level blocking due to TLS transport layer and bridges
+(I2P has proposals for "full restricted routes" but these are not yet implemented)
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ - {% trans %}Big enough that it has had to adapt to blocking and DOS attempts{% endtrans %}
+ - {% trans %}Designed and optimized for exit traffic, with a large number of exit nodes{% endtrans %}
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+Better documentation, has formal papers and specifications,
+better website, many more translations
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ - {% trans %}More efficient with memory usage{% endtrans %}
+ - {% trans %}Tor client nodes have very low bandwidth overhead{% endtrans %}
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+Centralized control reduces the complexity at each
+node and can efficiently address Sybil attacks
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+A core of high capacity nodes provides higher
+throughput and lower latency
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ - {% trans %}C, not Java (ewww){% endtrans %}
-Benefits of I2P over Tor
+{{ _('Benefits of I2P over Tor') }}
- - Designed and optimized for hidden services, which are much faster than in Tor
- - Fully distributed and self organizing
- - Peers are selected by continuously profiling and ranking performance,
- rather than trusting claimed capacity
- - Floodfill peers ("directory servers") are varying and untrusted,
- rather than hardcoded
- - Small enough that it hasn't been blocked or DOSed much, or at all
- - Peer-to-peer friendly
- - Packet switched instead of circuit switched
+
- {% trans %}Designed and optimized for hidden services, which are much faster than in Tor{% endtrans %}
+ - {% trans %}Fully distributed and self organizing{% endtrans %}
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+Peers are selected by continuously profiling and ranking performance,
+rather than trusting claimed capacity
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+Floodfill peers ("directory servers") are varying and untrusted,
+rather than hardcoded
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ - {% trans %}Small enough that it hasn't been blocked or DOSed much, or at all{% endtrans %}
+ - {% trans %}Peer-to-peer friendly{% endtrans %}
+ - {% trans %}Packet switched instead of circuit switched{% endtrans %}
- - implicit transparent load balancing of messages
- across multiple peers, rather than a single path
- - resilience vs. failures by running multiple
- tunnels in parallel, plus rotating tunnels
- - scale each client's connections at O(1) instead
- of O(N) (Alice has e.g. 2 inbound tunnels that are
- used by all of the peers Alice is talking with,
- rather than a circuit for each)
-
- - Unidirectional tunnels instead of bidirectional
- circuits, doubling the number of nodes a peer has to
- compromise to get the same information.
- - Protection against detecting client activity, even
- when an attacker is participating in the tunnel, as
- tunnels are used for more than simply passing end
- to end messages (e.g. netDb, tunnel management,
- tunnel testing)
- - Tunnels in I2P are short lived, decreasing the number
- of samples that an attacker can use to mount an
- active attack with, unlike circuits in Tor, which are
- typically long lived.
- - I2P APIs are designed specifically for anonymity and
- security, while SOCKS is designed for functionality.
- - Essentially all peers participate in routing for others
- - The bandwidth overhead of being a full peer is low,
- while in Tor, while client nodes don't require much
- bandwidth, they don't fully participate in the mixnet.
- - Integrated automatic update mechanism
- - Both TCP and UDP transports
- - Java, not C (ewww)
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+implicit transparent load balancing of messages
+across multiple peers, rather than a single path
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+resilience vs. failures by running multiple
+tunnels in parallel, plus rotating tunnels
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+scale each client's connections at O(1) instead
+of O(N) (Alice has e.g. 2 inbound tunnels that are
+used by all of the peers Alice is talking with,
+rather than a circuit for each)
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+
+
+
+{% trans -%}
+Unidirectional tunnels instead of bidirectional
+circuits, doubling the number of nodes a peer has to
+compromise to get the same information.
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+
+{% trans -%}
+Protection against detecting client activity, even
+when an attacker is participating in the tunnel, as
+tunnels are used for more than simply passing end
+to end messages (e.g. netDb, tunnel management,
+tunnel testing)
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+
+{% trans -%}
+Tunnels in I2P are short lived, decreasing the number
+of samples that an attacker can use to mount an
+active attack with, unlike circuits in Tor, which are
+typically long lived.
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+
+{% trans -%}
+I2P APIs are designed specifically for anonymity and
+security, while SOCKS is designed for functionality.
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ {% trans %}Essentially all peers participate in routing for others{% endtrans %}
+
+{% trans -%}
+The bandwidth overhead of being a full peer is low,
+while in Tor, while client nodes don't require much
+bandwidth, they don't fully participate in the mixnet.
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ {% trans %}Integrated automatic update mechanism{% endtrans %}
+ {% trans %}Both TCP and UDP transports{% endtrans %}
+ {% trans %}Java, not C (ewww){% endtrans %}
-Other potential benefits of I2P but not yet implemented
-...and may never be implemented, so don't count on them!
+{{ _('Other potential benefits of I2P but not yet implemented') }}
+{% trans %}...and may never be implemented, so don't count on them!{% endtrans %}
- - Defense vs. message count analysis by garlic wrapping
- multiple messages
- - Defense vs. long term intersection by adding delays
- at various hops (where the delays are not discernible
- by other hops)
- - Various mixing strategies at the tunnel level (e.g.
- create a tunnel that will handle 500 messages / minute,
- where the endpoint will inject dummy messages if there
- are insufficient messages, etc)
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+Defense vs. message count analysis by garlic wrapping
+multiple messages
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+Defense vs. long term intersection by adding delays
+at various hops (where the delays are not discernible
+by other hops)
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+ -
+{% trans -%}
+Various mixing strategies at the tunnel level (e.g.
+create a tunnel that will handle 500 messages / minute,
+where the endpoint will inject dummy messages if there
+are insufficient messages, etc)
+{%- endtrans %}
+
{% endblock %}