diff --git a/i2p2www/spec/proposals/153-chacha20-layer-encryption.rst b/i2p2www/spec/proposals/153-chacha20-layer-encryption.rst
index e8283be4..75cc2b9c 100644
--- a/i2p2www/spec/proposals/153-chacha20-layer-encryption.rst
+++ b/i2p2www/spec/proposals/153-chacha20-layer-encryption.rst
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ ChaCha Tunnel Layer Encryption
     :author: chisana
     :created: 2019-08-04
     :thread: http://zzz.i2p/topics/2753
-    :lastupdated: 2019-08-04
-    :status: Draft
+    :lastupdated: 2019-08-05
+    :status: Open
 
 .. contents::
 
@@ -333,3 +333,9 @@ The padding oracle attacks against AES256/CBC won't work, because no padding is
 changed to non-mod-16 lengths, AES256/CBC would still not be vulnerable due to rejected duplicate IVs.
 
 Both attacks are also blocked by disallowing multiple oracle calls using the same IV, since duplicate IVs are rejected.
+
+References
+==========
+
+.. [Tunnel-Implementation]
+   https://geti2p.net/en/docs/tunnels/implementation