% -> % to fix translations problems

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str4d
2013-08-15 21:27:54 +00:00
parent 4ae84aa9e2
commit fd6b1e91b1
48 changed files with 285 additions and 326 deletions

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@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ willing to contribute. The defense against this is:
Set defaults so that most users provide resources to the network.
In I2P, users route traffic by default. In sharp distinction to
<a href="{{ comparisons }}">other networks</a>,
over 95% of I2P users relay traffic for others.
over 95&#37; of I2P users relay traffic for others.
{%- endtrans %}</li>
<li>{% trans -%}
Provide easy configuration options so that users may increase their
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ Reference: <a href="{{ pdf }}">Breaking and Improving Protocol Obfuscation</a>
Sybil describes a category of attacks where the adversary creates arbitrarily
large numbers of colluding nodes and uses the increased numbers to help
mounting other attacks. For instance, if an attacker is in a network where peers
are selected randomly and they want an 80% chance to be one of those peers, they
are selected randomly and they want an 80&#37; chance to be one of those peers, they
simply create five times the number of nodes that are in the network and roll
the dice. When identity is free, Sybil can be a very potent technique for a
powerful adversary. The primary technique to address this is simply to make
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ This is somewhat mitigated by our
<a href="{{ peerselection }}">peer profiling</a> methods used to monitor the performance
of peers.
However, this is a powerful attack as the number of routers approaches
<i>f</i> = 0.2, or 20% malicious nodes, as specifed in the paper.
<i>f</i> = 0.2, or 20&#37; malicious nodes, as specifed in the paper.
The malicous routers could also maintain connections to the target router and provide
excellent forwarding bandwidth for traffic over those connections, in an attempt
to manipulate the profiles managed by the target and appear attractive.