markup fixes

i2p2www/spec/proposals/111-ntcp-2.rst

@@ -379,15 +379,12 @@ The following crypto operations are required by each party to complete
 the handshake and start the data phase:
 
 - AES: 2
-- SHA256: 8 (Alice), 6 (Bob)
-          (not including 4 Alice, 6 Bob precalculated for all connections)
-          (not including HMAC-SHA256)
+- SHA256: 8 (Alice), 6 (Bob) (not including 4 Alice, 6 Bob precalculated for all connections) (not including HMAC-SHA256)
 - HMAC-SHA256: 15
 - ChaCha/Poly: 4
 - X25519 DH: 3
 - SipHash: 1
-- Signature verification: 1 (Bob) (Alice previously signed when generating her RI)
-  Presumably Ed25519 (dependent on RI sigtype)
+- Signature verification: 1 (Bob) (Alice previously signed when generating her RI)  Presumably Ed25519 (dependent on RI sigtype)
 
 
 The following crypto operations are required by each party for each data phase message:
@@ -424,7 +421,7 @@ Payload Security Properties
 
 .. raw:: html
 
-  {% highlight %}
+  {% highlight lang='text' %}
 XK(s, rs):           Authentication   Confidentiality
     <- s
     ...
@@ -569,7 +566,7 @@ exactly as defined in the Noise spec.
 
 .. raw:: html
 
-  {% highlight %}
+  {% highlight lang='text' %}
 
 This is the "e" message pattern:
 
@@ -675,7 +672,7 @@ Payload Security Properties
 
 .. raw:: html
 
-  {% highlight %}
+  {% highlight lang='text' %}
 XK(s, rs):           Authentication   Confidentiality
     -> e, es                  0                2
 
@@ -905,7 +902,7 @@ Key Derivation Function (KDF) (for handshake message 2)
 
 .. raw:: html
 
-  {% highlight %}
+  {% highlight lang='text' %}
 
 // probably do this also:
 h = SHA256(h || random padding from message 1)
@@ -980,7 +977,7 @@ Payload Security Properties
 
 .. raw:: html
 
-  {% highlight %}
+  {% highlight lang='text' %}
 XK(s, rs):           Authentication   Confidentiality
     <- e, ee                  2                1
 
@@ -1154,7 +1151,7 @@ Encryption for for handshake message 3 part 1, using message 1 KDF)
 
 .. raw:: html
 
-  {% highlight %}
+  {% highlight lang='text' %}
 
 // probably do this also:
 h = SHA256(h || random padding from message 2)
@@ -1185,8 +1182,7 @@ Key Derivation Function (KDF) (for handshake message 3 part 2)
 
 .. raw:: html
 
-  {% highlight %}
-
+  {% highlight lang='text' %}
 
 This is the "se" message pattern:
 
@@ -1254,7 +1250,7 @@ Payload Security Properties
 
 .. raw:: html
 
-  {% highlight %}
+  {% highlight lang='text' %}
 XK(s, rs):           Authentication   Confidentiality
     -> s, se                  2                5
 
@@ -1483,7 +1479,7 @@ Payload Security Properties
 
 .. raw:: html
 
-  {% highlight %}
+  {% highlight lang='text' %}
 XK(s, rs):           Authentication   Confidentiality
     <-                        2                5
     ->                        2                5
@@ -2079,11 +2075,11 @@ To detect the version of an incoming NTCP connection, Bob proceeds as follows:
 - Wait for at least 64 bytes (minimum NTCP2 message 1 size)
 - If the initial received data is 288 or more bytes, the incoming connection
   is version 1.
-- If less than 288 bytes, either:
-   1) Wait for a short time for more data
+- If less than 288 bytes, either
+   -  Wait for a short time for more data
       (good strategy before widespread NTCP2 adoption)
       if at least 288 total received, it's NTCP 1.
-   2) Try the first stages of decoding as version 2, if it fails, wait a short time for more data
+   -  Try the first stages of decoding as version 2, if it fails, wait a short time for more data
       (good strategy after widespread NTCP2 adoption)
       - Decrypt the first 32 bytes (the X key)
         of the SessionRequest packet using AES-256 with key RH_B.